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Abstract—In telecommunications and software engineering,
testing is normally understood to be essentially active: a tester
is said to stimulate, control, and enforce. Passive testing does
not ﬁt this paradigm and thus remains the niche research
subject, which bears on the scope and depth of the obtained
results. It is argued that such limited understanding of testing
is one of its many community-bound preconceptions. It may
be acceptable in the current engineering approach to testing,
but can and should be challenged in order to converge on the
core concepts of the proposed science of testing (“testology”).
This methodological work aims at establishing that there are
no fundamental reasons for admitting the dominant role of the
active element in testing. To show this, external (also extra-
technical) areas are consulted for insight, direct observations,
and metaphors. The troublesome distinction between (passive)
testing and monitoring, as well as unclear relations between
testing and measurements, are also addressed.
Keywords—behavior, development, metrology, monitoring, pas-
sive testing, reactive systems, Scientific Method.
1. Introduction
Testing is intertwined with the development (creation, con-
struction, and further use) of artifacts – intentionally de-
signed objects. Artifacts of a certain complexity are “me-
chanically” referred to as artiﬁcial systems. We understand
testing as the umbrella term for a particular set of con-
cepts, methods, and techniques of veriﬁcation and valida-
tion (V&V), i.e., assessing whether a system is correct w.r.t.
a given notion of correctness. This assessment leads, prag-
matically, to deciding whether a system is acceptable.
Testing cannot be replaced by other, “non-testing” V&V
techniques. Placed in a loop of development activities, test-
ing is a vital element in achieving and maintaining correct-
ness (and thus quality) of systems. The complexity of test-
ing, however, is known to grow exponentially in the com-
plexity of tested systems. Accordingly, despite the undis-
putable improvements in testing concepts and techniques,
spectacular system failures (including those that entail loss
of life), attributed to inadequate testing, still happen. In or-
der to sustain the pace of development of complex systems
(including telecommunications systems), it is necessary to
seek improvements in testing beyond its current, relatively
steady development. The aim of this work is to contribute
towards this end. Its underlying assumptions and theses are
brieﬂy presented below (see [1]–[5] for discussion).
Testing is currently researched and practiced mostly by
specialized groups, or schools, within separate commu-
nities concerned with particular classes of systems to be
tested. The immediate context of this work are systems
characteristic of information and communications technol-
ogy (ICT) – a ﬁeld deﬁned by convergence of traditional
telecommunications and informatics (software engineering
and computer science). The convergence of concepts and
approaches to the development (and thus – also to test-
ing) of ICT systems is far from complete. It thus makes
sense to refer, within ICT, to separate communities of soft-
ware testing, protocol testing, circuit testing, etc. There are
also groups concerned with testing outside ICT (chemical
testing, material testing, etc.), with their own, important
insight.
Testing communities speak particular languages (or, to
quote Wittgenstein, they play diﬀerent language-games).
They are reluctant to borrow the concepts and terms from
peer groups. Consequently, any preconceptions they may
have on testing cannot be easily confronted with other
patterns of understanding, and are very hard to uproot
(even if they clearly form a crippling self-restriction). This
phenomenon of conceptual and linguistic (terminological)
“lock-in” has been noticed, e.g., by Lamport [private com-
munication, 2010], who called it a “Whorﬁan syndrome”.
Testing schools tend to follow the engineering approach,
with its apprentice tradition of vocational study. The test-
ing concepts and terms are deﬁned stipulatively, to mean
what a given community wants them to mean. This par-
ticular understanding, as well as skills for its practical use,
are taught, and then checked during exams that lead to ob-
taining professional titles of a “certiﬁed tester” or the like.
Accordingly, there are sources of community-bound “stan-
dardized knowledge” of testing [6]–[11]. There is, however,
no common deﬁnition of testing that would be accepted
across the testing communities. Lack of such deﬁnition
indicates a serious problem with testing, as “a deﬁnition
inﬂuences future perceptions – a too narrow or misleading
one may block future investigations for a long time” [12].
In order to gain new perspectives, impetus, and funding,
testing needs to properly address the issues identiﬁed above.
To do so, it should transcend the limitations imposed by
the apprentice model, and establish itself as a science, with
academic recognition. This seems necessary not only for
immediate professional application of testing, but also for
its proper teaching, in a way that avoids seeding and per-
petuating the existing preconceptions in the new generation
of researchers – a concern that is not unique to testing [4].
This path has already been taken by metrology – the “sci-
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ence of measurement and its application” [13, 2.2]. For
the postulated new testing science, of the design science
kind, we propose the name: “Testology”. It would be the
producer and bearer of ﬁrst principles and core concepts
of testing, regardless of its area and context of application,
and would also allow forming the “applied testing” sub-
sets and specializations, with meaningful relations to each
other. Just as any other (design) science, testology is free
to seek linguistic and conceptual metaphors [14] without
any a priori restriction of the range of possible “donors”,
and to look into languages currently spoken by particular
testing schools, in the hope that “a core theory. . . can
be synthesized from writings across a number of disparate
ﬁelds” [15]. Also the general understanding of “testing”,
encoded in everyday language and reﬂected in dictionary
entries, should not be neglected. In this context, the exist-
ing sources of vocational knowledge on testing, including
the deﬁnition(s) of testing contained there, are only one of
the inputs available for consideration, and not the authori-
tative body of the concepts of testology.
To illustrate the postulated approach to testing, in the sequel
we focus on a single idea that currently prevails in virtually
all ICT-related testing schools, namely, that testing is active.
We argue that it is a community-bound preconception –
a conventional disciplinary modiﬁcation of the concept of
testing, which is not substantiated by any “deeper roots”
of emerging testology. We further argue that sticking to
this preconception is an unnecessary handicap for applied
testology – valuable research on passive testing is currently
conducted away from the mainstream, in a niche research
area, which bears on the breath, depth, and consistency
of obtained results. We claim that abandoning the “ac-
tive” preconception should bring more consistency to the
mainstream of testing research, by allowing the uniform
treatment of both active and passive testing, which in turn
may contribute to the postulated “nonlinear” improvement
in testing.
2. Status of Active and Passive Testing
In telecommunications, software engineering, and most
other technical disciplines, the prevailing intuition of testing
is reﬂected in its operational characterization as an activity
(stating what is being done while testing), in which a tester:
– generates and applies (sends) stimuli, or “test in-
put data”, in order to control a system under test
(Sut) – to provoke and guide phenomena (in our case
– mainly behavior) to be investigated by testing;
– observes phenomena as they appear under the inﬂu-
ence of applied stimuli;
– analyzes the relation between observed phenomena
and some reference (such as a pre-computed, in-
tended behavior);
– decides on a suitable verdict, which expresses the
assessment made.
This operational characterization is often taken as the oper-
ational deﬁnition of testing: all the enumerated operations
are quite tangible, and their joint presence is said to con-
stitute what shall (and, by complement, what should not)
be regarded as testing. This characterization is then im-
plicitly employed in the role of the deﬁnition of testing
(as in [16, pp. 14–16], where, on 600+ pages, no other ex-
plicit deﬁnition of testing is given), or is suitably rephrased,
as in [17]: “The principle of testing is to apply inputs. . .
and to compare the observed outputs to expected outputs”.
Similar deﬁnitions1, in various wording, prevail in “of-
ﬁcial”, vocational compendia, dictionaries of terms, and
meta-standards, and are also cited in research papers. Their
common element is that they stipulate the active character
of testing – a tester controls, solicits, and enforces. Active
testing constitutes the mainstream of testing.
On the other hand, since the early 1980s there has been
ongoing interest in passive testing, technically deﬁned as
a testing activity in which a tester does not inﬂuence (stim-
ulate) a Sut in any way – it does not apply any test stimuli.
Two typical approaches to such testing may be identiﬁed.
One party claims that the active character of testing reﬂects
its essence, and thus cannot be surrendered. It is natural for
this party to maintain that “passive testing” simply does not
respond to the concept of testing – that it is a spurious inter-
pretation, a mere fac¸on de parler, or the case of confusion
of tongues. Indeed, passive testing has not been identiﬁed
as a dimension of the discourse space of testing, nor even
alluded to, in the annotated bibliography of formal test-
ing [22], the proceedings of the prestigious Dagstuhl Sem-
inar on testing [23], taxonomies developed to get insight
into the notion of testing [24], [25], standardized glossaries
of terms pertaining to testing [6], [7] or broader software
engineering activities [19]. It is also, apparently, not cov-
ered by the new, forthcoming international software test-
ing standard ISO 29119. The telecommunications-oriented
methodology of conformance testing [26] openly excludes
passive testing from its scope. The standardized test lan-
guage TTCN-3 [27] was meant to express active tests, and
there have been very few proposals to re-use it also for
passive testing [28].
The other party investigates passive testing basing on its
arbitrarily adopted technical deﬁnition, without any deeper
concern for methodological harmonization with active test-
ing. This is how the majority of valuable results on passive
testing have been achieved so far. In order to avoid the “po-
litically incorrect” term, various euphemisms [3] are used:
observer, trace checker, the oracle, passive monitor, ar-
biter, supervisor. Another indication of the present niche
character of research on passive testing is its apparent dis-
continuity: frequent “restarts” and “re-inventions” of its key
elements – a phenomenon not unknown in science, but in
1 “Implementation. . . is exercised with selected sequences of in-
puts” [18]. “. . . the process of operating a system or component under
speciﬁed conditions [as explained elsewhere – understood to be imposed
by a tester]. . . ” [19]. “. . . testing always implies executing the program on
(valued) inputs” [20, ch. 5]. “Software testing involves. . . systematically
executing the software, while stimulating it with test inputs. . . ” [21].
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this case it is particularly easy to be ignorant of previous
work on passive testing (see [3] for examples).
Between these two approaches, there is an apparent gap:
very little has been written on the fundamental method-
ological issue of whether passive testing “should” be ad-
mitted as bona ﬁde testing. Serious attempts at starting
a discussion at the meta-level, about passive testing, are
known to have been vigorously rebuﬀed, as unnecessary,
idle, and – allegedly – showing disrespect for “established
and accepted truths”. This stance is understandable in the
vocational, engineering tradition, with its apprentice model,
but questioning the present state of a conceptual frame-
work is natural, healthy, and indispensable for any science,
and should not be confused with the “know-better” attitude.
This is yet another justiﬁcation for testology.
Apart from the intellectual challenge of establishing a place
for passive testing within testology, it can be shown that
there is the growing need for it. Recently, a stream of
reservations has been raised, by diﬀerent authors, concern-
ing the ability of testing, as it is traditionally understood,
to respond to evolving needs, as brieﬂy surveyed below.
Among the new tendencies and postulated further develop-
ments of formal model-based testing, [23] identiﬁes:
– integration of test techniques, in order to be able to
choose for every task their best combination,
– accepting that a product, however thoroughly tested,
evolves and changes.
Both postulates may be re-cast in terms of passive testing,
in the following way. Passive testing may be considered
as a particular set of combinations of constituent elements,
or “modules”, of the general testing methodology; active
testing would then be another, diﬀerent set of such com-
binations. This conceptual and technological modularity
was proposed by this author already in 1996 [29], and it
has been researched since then under the name of proto-
col multimeter (PMM) [30]. One of the hypotheses tacitly
adopted for active testing is that a system under test does
not change during the tests, and that it is still meaningful
to refer to test verdicts after the testing is over [31]. In
fact, however, all real-world implementations do change,
in unexpected ways and moments in time. This makes
active testing, performed in ﬁnite sessions, inherently in-
consistent with its hypotheses2, while the “campaign-less”
passive testing is not aﬀected.
In his unpublished keynote speech at the recent software
testing conference (ICST, Berlin, 2011), Ian Sommerville,
the authority on the design and testing of ICT systems, put
to doubt the universal validity of very foundations of test-
ing, as it is currently researched and practiced within ICT.
He identiﬁed these foundations as deriving from Hume’s
reductionism – reducing complex systems into manageable
parts, simple enough to be understood, and interpreting the
whole system in terms of interactions of these parts. This
approach is conspicuous in the succession of activities in
2Completeness of testing is usually deﬁned as a relative notion, based
on the assumption that hypotheses [32] are true.
software testing: unit, integration, system, and acceptance
testing. It is based on strong assumptions: that system
boundaries, boundaries of its parts, and the detailed speci-
ﬁcations and correctness notions for these parts can always
be established, and that there is control over both the pro-
cess of decomposition and putting together, and the oper-
ation of the parts (the latter being directly tied to active
testing). In systems of systems (including global telecom-
munications and information technology systems), these as-
sumptions simply do not hold: a system is multi-purpose
(and these purposes are not established a priori), it exhibits
emergent behavior (“we put it together and strange things
happen”; ibid.), it is not built at once, it is unlimited in size
and time scope, it is dynamically changing, it is not clear
what constitutes its parts, the boundaries of its stipulated
parts are constantly re-negotiated, and there is no single
notion of its failure. The consequences and recommenda-
tions for testing include: basing the testing of such systems
on “actual system operation, not mythical speciﬁcations”
(ibid.), and accepting that there is no single, pragmatically
meaningful result of testing (obtained by executing a par-
ticular test suite). Although this was not explicitly stated,
passive testing clearly addresses both concerns.
In the sequel, in order to question the distinguished role
of the “active” part of the concept of testing, we turn to
external, arguably – more generic ideas, including those
that had been established much earlier, before any current,
disciplinary connotations had any chance to set in.
3. Towards the Generic Concept
of Testing
It is possible to characterize testing very generally [3], in
a way that avoids preconceptions, as:
– an activity with at least some empirical, experimental
elements, the results of which can only be established
a posteriori;
– where experiments are conducted on a particular ob-
ject – thing under test (Tut);
– in order to evaluate a certain entity that partakes in
testing – the object of assessment (Ooa);
– conducted with a certain aim. The quasi-equivalent
formulations of this aim, adopted by diﬀerent schools
of thought, are:
– to establish whether a given relation, normally –
an equivalence or preorder holds between a Tut
and a given reference (Ref) as often adopted
within the formal testing community;
– to establish whether a given hypothesis, which
also means – all its necessary consequences,
or “requirements” concerning a Tut, can be re-
garded as true (this is the essence of the log-
ical approach to testing, as exempliﬁed by the
“industry-oriented” testing framework [26], and
also that of the Scientiﬁc Method);
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– to obtain knowledge as to whether Tut corre-
sponds to a Ref in a speciﬁc way (where the
need for testing may be restated as the need to
know if a system is correct – this is the language
of epistemology).
A test result, or test outcome, always pertains to a Tut3 –
it records how a Tut behaved during a test. A test verdict,
normally in {Pass,Fail,Inconclusive}, pertains to the
object of assessment, which may, or may not be a Tut. The
(non)identity of Tut and Ooa is subject to some debate. In
engineering (and thus also in traditional ICT testing), a Tut
is indeed taken to be the object of assessment (and thus,
also the object of the ensuing corrective actions, if nec-
essary), which is often reﬂected in various deﬁnitions of
testing. In natural sciences, however, the object of assess-
ment is normally a Ref – a hypothesis that explains and
predicts facts about Tut – it is this hypothesis, not “the
world”, which may be found by testing to be defective. Re-
directing the assessment is also possible, e.g., for reverse
engineering [33].
The relations between Tut, Ref, and Ooa are just one di-
mension in a matrix of choices for sensible combinations of
elements in the conceptual space of testing. Some of these
combinations are actually claimed and occupied by diﬀer-
ent research schools, and other – are still to be “discovered”
and tried out. In [1] it has been shown how much ﬂexibil-
ity is to be gained by surrendering some habitual choices.
Herein it is claimed that insisting on testing being active is
one of such choices, the origin of which is no longer clear.
Nowhere in the proposed “generic” exposition of testing
“being active” appears as a necessary property of testing.
In Aristotelian theory of predication, such property might
be essential – included in a deﬁnition (as it is currently pre-
sented), or might be a proprium (idion) – still necessary,
and derivable from a deﬁnition, but not explicitly present
in this deﬁnition. In this author’s opinion, “being active”
appears rather to be of the third kind of predication – an
accident of testing.
4. Testing and the Scientiﬁc Method
Testing, as a concept, did not emerge with technical sys-
tems. The important pre-technical, philosophical (epis-
temological) aspects of testing are present in the Sci-
entiﬁc Method (SM) – a group of paradigms of sound
scientiﬁc enquiry; in particular, we refer to one mem-
ber of this group, attributed to W. Whewell, J. S. Mill,
and K. Popper. It is primarily applicable to natural sci-
ences, which does not preclude it from being a viable
source of insight in a more technical context. As illustrated
3Admittedly, “Tut” is not an established term, but other, more conven-
tional terms such as Sut (System under Test), Iut (Implementation under
Test), Eut (Equipment Under Test) are too speciﬁc, being related to a par-
ticular test architecture or kind of tests.
in Fig. 1, the application of SM consists in taking a series
of steps:
– identifying a problem (i.e., a set of phenomena);
– stating a hypothesis that explains this problem –
a statement p about “the world”, preferably presented
as a logical formula;
– deducing a set of the necessary logical consequences
of the hypothesis: {p → q1, p → q2, . . .}, where qk
must hold if p is indeed true;
– expressing the selected consequences in terms of
their individual “empirical content” – predicted phe-
nomena f , in principle amenable to empirical ob-
servation, such that q is true iﬀ f “exists” (i.e., de-
pending on its nature, occurs, holds, is present or
absent);
– testing the hypothesis – performing experiments
aimed speciﬁcally at conﬁrming or denying the exis-
tence of predicted phenomena.
Fig. 1. Tests in the Scientiﬁc Method ([3]).
It is possible to check by purely formal means if the de-
rived consequences of a hypothesis are non-contradictory.
This non-empirical element appears in testing theories and
practices as a “static phase” of testing; e.g., as static con-
formance review [26]. Being a priori, it does not count as
testing proper, and is not presented as such in SM. In gen-
eral, however, even the fundamental a posteriori character
of testing is not universally admitted. Two quite opposite
views on this matter, both voiced in “oﬃcial” publications
of the testing community, are: ”unlike dynamic testing. . .
static testing techniques rely on. . . ” [8], and “Diﬀerent
from testing, and complementary to it, are static tech-
niques. . . ” [20]. This shows, again, how arbitrary the con-
ceptual foundations of testing are, and further legitimatizes
raising and investigating doubts about these foundations.
Experiments entail empirical observation. The same
method and means of such observation could be used in
diﬀerent ways, with diﬀerent aims, e.g., in the initial phase
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of the application of the method – to “charge” one’s intu-
ition as to the phenomena about which one is to propose
an explanation. This activity, although empirical, does not
qualify as testing – it should rather be called monitoring.
Two extreme views on how to approach the testing of
a hypothesis, or directions of testing, are (disregarding nu-
ances): veriﬁcationism, according to which a hypothesis,
to be accepted as true, must be convincingly conﬁrmed or
corroborated, (also – veriﬁed, in the sense: shown to be
true), and falsiﬁcationism (attributed to Karl Popper), which
holds that it is essentially not possible to empirically verify
a hypothesis, and the only sensible (meaningful) direction
is to try to falsify (refute) it. This very inﬂuential Popperian
stance [34], taken to the ground of ICT, re-emerged in the
well known observation by Edsgar Dijkstra that “testing can
only show the presence of bugs [i.e., can falsify the claim
of correctness] but never their absence [i.e., cannot verify
that all the system’s properties are as predicted]”. Pure
approaches, however, are extremely rare – practical appli-
cations of the scientiﬁc method almost always combine the
elements of veriﬁcation and falsiﬁcation, in varying propor-
tions (as was also explicitly postulated for technical valida-
tion activities in [35]). Popper admitted that corroboration
does count scientiﬁcally, if obtained for genuinely risky
predictions. In this sense, the Dijkstra’s observation seems
surprisingly shallow and misleading. It overlooks the very
principles of model-based testing [24] with its accompany-
ing assumptions (or test hypotheses [32]), under which it is
perfectly possible to (conditionally) prove correctness.
The role of experiments is to conﬁrm or deny the existence
of phenomena, regardless of how “existence” and “exper-
iment” are technically deﬁned. The outcome of executed
experiments is thus associated with verdicts: P (pass) if an
experiment conﬁrms the existence a predicted phenomenon,
F (fail) if it denies this existence, and I (inconclusive) if nei-
ther holds. In general, P is not the converse of F, although
in particular testing theories this may be the case. Accord-
ing to the idea of the “non-orthodox” Scientiﬁc Method, as
shown in Fig. 1, tests-experiments for each phenomenon are
divided into two groups: {T} – tests aiming at falsiﬁcation
(so only able to issue a F or an I), and {T ′} – tests aiming
at corroboration (so only able to issue P or I). For some
predicted phenomena (like fk and fm), only one of these
groups of tests may be present. It is also conceivable that
a falsiﬁcation and corroboration test be combined in a sin-
gle experimentation unit, so that its verdict is in {P,F,I}.
This is the basic form of tests considered in [26]. It has di-
rect representation in the linguistic devices of the TTCN-3
test language [27]. It is, however, by no means generic.
Conﬁrmation and refutation, not being the converse of each
other, may need entirely diﬀerent experimental approaches,
and these are likely to translate into unrelated, orthogonal
test programs, the composition of which may be unneces-
sarily complex and purely artiﬁcial.
Let us now combine the Scientiﬁc Method with the general
view on tests presented in the preceding section. It can be
seen that a hypothesis p is, at the same time, a Ref and an
Ooa, while a Tut is a fragment of “the world”, in which
predicted phenomena occur. This setting can be brought
closer to what is customary in ICT-related testing, by stat-
ing “Tut is correct” as p, and accepting, as the necessary
logical consequences {q1,q2, . . .} of this hypothesis, the
requirements (if a testing theory is cast in logic [36]) or
particular features of a behavioral model (for a process-
oriented approach). In this case, the consequences are
obtained in a diﬀerent way – they are not really derived
from p, as very little can be derived, by pure logic, from
“Tut is correct”4. Instead, some subset of consequences
would contain the explicitly stated, essential requirements
that deﬁne a correct Tut, and another, possibly very large
set would contain its propria, derivable from the deﬁning
requirements, but not explicitly stated in a deﬁnition of Tut
(and so, formally, not counted as essential). The place of
accidental consequences in this picture is most dubious,
as it is in philosophy in general. Accidents are not really
instrumental in distinguishing things (correct implementa-
tions of A from correct implementations of A′, or correct
and incorrect implementations of A). Stating the “proper”
set of q that would be subject to testing is one of the pri-
mary problems in testing theories. In natural sciences, new
q are produced and subjected to testing continually. In
technical testing, this problem is recast as test generation
and selection. Associating particular q with diﬀerent gen-
eral kinds of properties (e.g., according to the Aristotelian
concepts) is also tacitly practised, which transpires from,
e.g., the telecommunications-oriented concept of “essential
requirements” (as opposed to non-essential requirements,
the testing of which might be skipped).
Within SM, “experiment” and “test” have, for all practical
purposes, the same sense. What is this sense, has been
investigated by philosophy of science [37], but nowhere
within the context of the Scientiﬁc Method an experiment
is described as necessarily active, i.e., that in which inﬂu-
ence is purposefully exerted upon investigated phenomena.
The distinction between passive (or “natural”, or quasi-
experiments) and active (or “controlled”) tests/experiments
has been, however, noticed and discussed. J. S. Mill calls
them, respectively, pure observation and artiﬁcial experi-
ments [38], and ﬁnds a place for both in scientiﬁc enquiry
(and thus – in the Scientiﬁc Method). According to Mill,
their essence is, respectively, to “ﬁnd an instance in nature
suited to our purposes, or, by an artiﬁcial arrangement of
circumstances, make one”. At a suﬃciently high level of
abstraction there seems to be “no diﬀerence in kind, no real
logical distinction, between the two processes of investiga-
tion. . . as the uses of money are the same whether it is
inherited or acquired”. Mill does acknowledge the “great
disadvantage” of pure observation, such as the apparent in-
ability to ascertain causal relations and “to produce a much
greater number of variations in the circumstances than na-
ture spontaneously oﬀers”. He also identiﬁes circumstances
in which pure observation is advantageous, and his argu-
4If we ignore some quite fundamental, but still disputed philosophical
consequences, such as “Tut exists” or “something is correct”.
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ments resemble the current expositions of the distinguishing
features and applications of passive testing.
One Mill’s remark, if taken literally, may provide the un-
derstanding of passive testing that directly maps onto active
testing: “Instead of being able to choose what the concomi-
tant circumstances shall be, we now have to discover what
they are“ (ibid.). The “concomitant circumstances” map to
a particular test purpose as pursued by means of a partic-
ular test preamble (both being the elements of active tests,
as stipulated in [26]). Instead of actively executing a test
preamble, a passive tester recognizes it if and when it hap-
pens to occur. According to this interpretation, it is, in
principle, possible to use the same test suite, however gen-
erated, for active and passive testing. The idea of recogniz-
ing a sequence of events embedded in a trace of behavior
has been explored within the pattern-matching approach to
passive testing [39], but, to this author’s knowledge, it has
not been developed so far as to suggest that these patterns
may directly correspond to preambles taken from an active
test suite.
5. Connotations of Passive Testing
As already stated, the prevailing operational characteriza-
tion of testing derives from Mill’s controlled experiments.
Similarly, passive testing may be said to be based on quasi-
experiments – the observation and assessment of phenom-
ena that are not invoked (provoked, stimulated, inﬂuenced)
by a tester. Pragmatically, this lack of inﬂuence may be
intended or required for the following reasons.
The nature of a phenomenon may not allow for such inﬂu-
ence (e.g., as in the investigation of the radiation spectrum
of a distant star). In testing applied to technical systems,
this translates to the absence of input port(s) – their gen-
uine, physical absence, their administratively imposed inac-
cessibility for testing, or (as may be common for systems of
systems) lack of information on whereabouts of these ports.
Proposing that a Tut should provide the “testing ports” is
a part of the design for testability framework [40]; one of
its ideas postulates equipping a system with additional de-
vices (interfaces and special functional properties), specif-
ically for the purposes of its prospective, eventual testing.
This approach has currency, e.g., in electronic circuit de-
sign, but is not advocated (or is even “prohibited”) in most
testing contexts in telecommunications.
A phenomenon may be “intensive enough”. As an analogy,
consider the dictionary meaning of “test” in chemistry: it is
deﬁned as a process of identifying the presence or the na-
ture of a substance, commonly by the addition of a reagent.
A reagent (and also a catalyst, which may be used for sim-
ilar purposes) is analogous to a focused stimulus, which
makes a phenomenon or substance reveal itself.
External stimulation (although feasible) might change or
distort a phenomenon. There remains, however, a philo-
sophical question as to whether passive observation really
solves this problem. The observer eﬀect (not to be conﬂated
with the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle) is a posited
principle, according to which a mere act of observation
necessarily changes the phenomenon being observed. On
the macro scale, in the setting of complex ICT systems,
this concern may be safely dismissed5.
A Sut may be a larger system whose integrity, safety, and
performance critically depends on non-interference with its
internal parts and processes. Normally, active tests would
include incorrect, invalid, unexpected (inopportune [26])
stimuli that would have an a priori unknown eﬀect upon
a system6, which may well be catastrophic to the system’s
mission – as in the U.S. network-wide failure of 1990 [42],
and also in the Chernobyl’s disaster, both caused by a stim-
ulus that was not even incorrect or unexpected per se.
Finally, it may be too cumbersome or costly to build and
operate the “sending” channel of a tester, through which
stimuli would be administered.
One may claim that, regardless of any technical, local deﬁ-
nitions, it is “common knowledge” that testing is active, as
(supposedly) codiﬁed in the language and reﬂected in the
common use patterns of the term, recorded in dictionary
entries7. The passive nature of testing is stipulated, or at
least not rejected, in the following dictionary entries for
“test”:
– the means by which the presence. . . of anything is
determined (this closely resembles tests for the pres-
ence of a phenomenon in SM, which, as already in-
dicated, do not have to be active);
– trial – the examination before a judicial tribunal of
the facts. . . in a case (where the tribunal has no
power to inﬂuence the course of the past events to
re-enact alternative scenarios).
The active elements are emphasized in the following en-
tries:
– trial; to try out (in order to be tested, something must
be actually used, which connotes both-way interac-
tions with this entity);
– a set of standardized questions, problems, or tasks
designed to elicit responses for use in measuring the
traits, capacities, or achievements of an individual
(to elicit responses is the explicit role of stimuli in
active tests).
Altogether, basing on [44] it may be concluded that the
active and passive connotations of “test” are well bal-
anced.
Distinctions made in the purely technical context are
also much less clear-cut than it is usually admitted. One
5Although there have been insightful discussions on the behaviour of
automata, in which both principles have been used (at least metaphorically)
under the name of “complementarity” [41].
6If this eﬀect were known a priori, testing would not be needed at all.
7This is a genuine and acknowledged problem. For example, in [43] it is
noted that “the ﬁeld of IS [Information Systems] development is severely
hampered by the limitation of meaning derived from the everyday use of
some representative words. . . ”.
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of the early attempts at harmonizing active and passive
testing [45] has been to employ two testers operating in
parallel: an active tester for conﬁrmation tests leading to
the P verdicts, and a passive tester, originally called a trace
analyser, for refutation tests leading to the F verdicts. This
solution was based on the earlier idea of separating the
problem of choosing and applying test inputs (stimuli –
the “pure” active part of testing) from the problem of
assessing the behavior of a Tut for these or any other
stimuli that may have been provided, by any means [46].
In both approaches, the passive testing functionality may
form a part of a compound (eﬀectively – active) tester,
or may, in the limit, form the whole of a tester – a self-
contained passive tester. The conditions for such trans-
formations were discussed in [3]. In these early stages,
a passive tester was apparently treated as a bona ﬁde en-
tity, and not as a metaphor. Interestingly, one of the ﬁrst
direct uses of the term “passive testing” (instead of various
euphemisms) was made in [47], when the initial accep-
tance for passive testing as (a kind of) testing seemed to
evaporate.
6. Testing versus Monitoring
It is surprisingly diﬃcult to precisely state the diﬀerence
between monitoring and testing a system. The common
tendency so far has been to conﬂate monitoring with passive
testing8. The prevailing intuition is that monitoring is not
testing, so “passive testing is not testing” as well. We argue
that it is both necessary and possible to keep the two notions
apart – they have diﬀerent sense, even if, in the limit, they
may refer to technically “the same” activity.
Let us assume that at least some level of technical instru-
mentation is necessary, and that the suitable technical in-
struments: a monitor and a passive tester, respectively, are
present. In the following, we treat monitoring as using
a monitor, resp. testing as using a tester, and we look at
each of the constituent parts of the decomposed concepts
separately. Using a thing (an apparatus) presupposes the ex-
istence of a user – some external entity that is not a monitor
(resp. a passive tester). Clearly, not every use of technical
instruments lies within the scope of the respective notions –
using a monitor to hammer down nails would certainly not
count as monitoring. The pertinent question is what use
of a monitor (tester) makes for monitoring (testing), and
how this “proper” use is related to the functionality of the
instrument.
We ﬁrst consult the basic dictionary meanings of “mon-
itoring” [44], noting the recurring use of two key terms:
looking (or watching) and seeing:
1. Listening to transmitted signals in order to check
the quality of the transmission. Monitoring is thus
performed in order to check (some properties), but
checks themselves are left to the user. Consider
8 “Monitoring is . . . called passive testing. . . ” [48].
a medical monitor (e.g., an electrocardiograph). The
output of a monitoring system is a stream of data,
suitably (e.g., graphically) presented so that it can
be conveniently interpreted. The interpretation itself
rests with the doctor, who on diﬀerent occasions can
look at (the same) data from diﬀerent perspectives,
in order to see if there is any activity of the heart, or
if the heart-beat is regular, etc.
2. Observing, recording, or detecting (an operation or
condition) with instruments that have no eﬀect upon
the operation or condition. This deﬁnition stresses
the passive and technical character of the operation.
”Detecting” suggests the higher-level functionality
that will be later assigned to an extended monitor.
3. Keeping track of, checking continually. This stipu-
lates a ”campaign-less”, possibly inﬁnite process.
Points (2) and (3) correspond to the joint characteristics
of monitoring and passive testing, while point (1) seems
useful for diﬀerentiating the two. It relies on diﬀerences
between looking (watching, listening) and seeing (hearing).
According to [44], to look means: to direct one’s glance,
attention, consideration (to watch – to keep under attentive
view or observation, as in order to see something); to see
means: to perceive (things) mentally, to discern, to under-
stand, to recognize.
The ﬁrst approach to diﬀerentiating between monitor-
ing and passively testing a thing under investigation – Tui
(it is not known yet whether it is thing under monitoring –
Tum, or Tut) is based of diﬀerent levels of interpretations
(see Fig. 2). Monitoring is a technical counterpart of watch-
Fig. 2. Monitoring and passive testing.
ing a particular aspect of a system. Monitoring provides,
in a passive way, a continued stream of processed data on
the behavior of a Tum. These data are intended to be
interpreted by an external process (in particular, but not
exclusively, by a human operator), where the underlying
phenomena or properties of a Tum can be seen. Unlike
monitoring, passive testing involves both, the (syntactic)
process of watching, and the (semantic) interpretative pro-
cess of seeing. The latter may still be performed by a hu-
man test operator (as is often stipulated in approaches to
testing characteristic of software engineering). The output
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of the passive testing process is a stream of interpretations,
or valuations (ν) of monitored data.
A basic technical apparatus for monitoring, a simple (or
plain) monitor (M in Fig. 2) is thus assigned functions for:
syntactically transforming (ﬁltering, projecting) a stream of
“raw data” about the behavior of Tum into a stream of pro-
cessed data: σ 7→ σ ′ = Φ(σ); and suitably presenting (for-
matting) the processed data: σ ′ 7→Π(σ ′), so that the stream
of formatted data can be conveniently interpreted. The pre-
sentation function is not mere aesthetic decoration; it is an
important part of the notion of monitoring. Both syntactic
processing and pragmatic presentation mode depend on the
intended external interpretation process – the understand-
ing is that of “monitoring for. . . ” or “monitoring in order
to. . . ”. Monitoring is thus not purpose-agnostic.
Experience shows that it is quite common to shift some
semantic interpretation functions (e.g., raising an alarm if
a threshold is exceeded) from an external process to the
monitoring process itself, which will now be referred to as
extended monitoring. A monitor enhanced with the inter-
pretation function I is an extended monitor (Me in Fig. 3a).
Such a device would be able to, e.g., raise an alarm when
certain threshold values are exceeded (as in a class of med-
ical monitors), while still being referred to as a monitor,
and not a tester. A single layer of inbuilt interpretations
yields what might be called tier 1 of extended monitoring
of S. There may be many consecutive tiers of extended
monitoring.
Fig. 3. Plain and extended monitoring: (a) tiers of extended
monitoring; (b) shifting the boundary of the monitored system.
One way to conceptually dispose of the notion of ex-
tended monitoring (and to stay with “just” monitoring),
is to re-position the boundary of a system under monitor-
ing – the stream of interpretations is now regarded as raw
data γ on the behavior of another system S’ (Fig. 3b). The
original system S is now embedded in a context, which
makes it clear that its behavior can only be investigated
indirectly9.
When interpretations become a part of the monitoring pro-
cess itself, the distinction between monitoring and passive
testing, as proposed in Fig. 2, seems to collapse – the out-
put of both processes is now a stream of interpretations.
Additionally, with the growing number of tiers of extended
monitoring (Fig. 3a), there is no clear point at which mon-
itoring would “magically” change into (passive) testing. It
thus becomes apparent that another, additional criterion for
distinguishing monitoring and passive testing is necessary.
We take this additional criterion to be the kind of interpre-
tations that are carried out within the respective processes,
as already hinted in [49]. Let us consider a pair: < B,C >
consisting of a particular behavior, and circumstances (con-
ditions) in which this behavior is exhibited. We claim that
monitoring and (passive) testing diﬀer in the pragmatically
meaningful, logical ordering of the elements of this pair. In
(extended) monitoring, interpretation (valuation) serves to
infer, from the observed behavior, the conditions (circum-
stances), or the general mode of operation of a Tum, such
as “being overloaded (congested)”, “being down”, “being
stable”, “being under attack” (in the context of intrusion
detection [1]), or “being dead” (in the medical context).
This is consistent with the view that “monitoring consists
of measuring properties of the network, and of inferring
an aggregate predicate from these measurements” [50]. In
testing, interpretation is related to the deﬁned circumstances
(conditions), called in this context test purposes. In active
testing, a test system, steered by a test program, establishes
(forces) these conditions, while in passive testing a test
system recognizes them. Note that the same understanding
was also arrived at earlier, although in a diﬀerent way.
It follows from the foregoing discussion that monitoring can
be located as a lower-layer functionality with its results in-
terpreted by testing, or as a higher-layer functionality acting
on a stream of lower-layer test verdicts. According to this
view, both monitoring and passive testing are “full”, but
diﬀerent functionalities, with no ﬁxed subordination rela-
tion between them. We conclude that passive testing can
be distinguished from monitoring, and thus can be freed
from one of its strongest “non-testing” connotations.
7. Testing versus Measurements
Intuitively, testing and measuring are closely related (as
in: test and measurement), but distinct concepts. This in-
tuition makes metrology an interesting source of concepts
and mechanisms to be directly imported, and also general
insight and analogies. Some links between the two domains
have already been brieﬂy identiﬁed in [3]. To be a mea-
surement, determining/assigning a value must be based on
empirical observation of a real, existing object – similarly
9This setting can be re-cast as veriﬁcation-in-context [35]. This is also
the classical telecommunications setting, where S, called Iut (Implemen-
tation under test), is embedded in, and only indirectly accessible through,
other parts of a Sut.
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for testing. According to [51], the necessary conditions for
calling an evaluation a measurement are: a well-deﬁned,
external reference, and a well-deﬁned measurement oper-
ation which can be carried out independently of any spe-
ciﬁc measurer. These two postulates have always been the
cornerstones of formal testing: the former is at the very
core of model-based testing, and the latter was given due
consideration, e.g., in [26] as “Conformance Assessment
Process”.
Surprisingly, the in-depth, direct, non-metaphorical discus-
sion of the relations between measurements and testing is
lacking. The measurement community at least declares in-
terest in suitably extending and adjusting their methodol-
ogy so as to accommodate testing, but any reciprocal ef-
fort from the testing community has not manifested itself.
The metrological interest in testing is mainly due to the
conceptual troubles with applying traditional concepts of
measurement (implicitly focused on physical quantities10)
to information technology artifacts, with their logical prop-
erties [53]. Despite this declared interest, the current ef-
fects of harmonization are modest. Conspicuously, “mea-
surement” and “testing” are deﬁned not side-by-side, but in
diﬀerent metrological documents: “Measurement – process
of experimentally obtaining one or more quantity values
that can reasonably be attributed to a quantity” [13, 2.1]
vs. “Testing: determination of one or more characteris-
tics of a given object of assessment according to a proce-
dure” [54]. One of the rare explicit explanations of the
distinction is “sometimes made by considering testing to
be a measurement or measurements together with a com-
parison to a speciﬁcation” (ibid.). This explanation is,
however, ﬂawed in that “comparison to a speciﬁcation”,
in a broad sense, is also the internal element of most
methods of measurement.
The main obstacle to directly applying metrological con-
cepts to testing seems to be the core concept of metrol-
ogy – the measurand, which is controversial in itself, and
subject to internal, metrological debate [55]. A measurand
is a quantity, i.e., a property that has a magnitude that can
be expressed using numbers [13, 1.1] (more generally –
expressed symbolically). The minimum requirement seems
to be that the objects of measurement can be ordered w.r.t.
the magnitude of a quantity in question. The mainstream
concepts of metrology pertain to such quantities that mean-
ingful algebraic operations on their values (expressions of
magnitude) can be deﬁned, so that the results of these op-
erations reﬂect the empirical relations between quantities
of respective objects. Metrology also explicitly admits or-
dinal quantities, which can be (numerically) expressed and
which enter into (empirical) ordering relations, but with
no corresponding algebraic operations on the expressions
of their values (e.g., garment sizes: {XS,S,M,L,XL}). The
values of these quantities can be obtained by a conven-
tional measurement procedure. There are also properties
that have been speciﬁcally excluded from the scope of the
10“. . . the measurement of a well-deﬁned physical quantity — the mea-
surand” [52, 1.2]
concept of “quantity”, and thus also from the scope of
“measurement” – nominal properties that have no mag-
nitude [13, 1.30], although can be assigned a (symbolic)
value. Sex and colour have been given as an example
(ibid.), although this is debatable – ordering (the “value” of)
humans by sex or race has often, sadly, been practiced11,
and colour has an obvious “objective” value (wavelength).
Despite this somewhat arbitrary exclusion, there have been
attempts at the metrological treatment of taxonomic, nom-
inal relations (such as postal codes [56]).
For testing, the “measurand” would be correctness, and
the conventional expression of its value is a verdict, in





should bring more metrological connotations). It may seem
to be the nominal, taxonomic property, oﬃcially – beyond
the scope of metrology. In testing, however, the verdicts
(reﬂecting the “magnitude” of correctness) do introduce
ordering on systems – incorrect systems are “less than”
correct ones, and there may be diﬀerent implementations
of a standard that are “equally correct”. There is also the
explicit ordering on verdicts: P → I → F, built into the
semantics of the test language TTCN [27]. On the other
hand, composing a correct and incorrect system may yield
a system that is correct or incorrect, which a priori can-
not be established by applying any operations to their indi-
vidual correctness values. This is why, after conformance
testing, combined systems are subjected to interoperability
tests.
It may be concluded that the direct application of metro-
logical concepts and language to testing seems no more
controversial than the ongoing debates within metrology
itself (including the notion of a measurand). If, however,
mutual harmonization is for any reason unacceptable, then
metrology may always be used as a source domain for sci-
entiﬁc metaphors [5] aimed at explicating testology. As
in any similar case, the metrological community has no
“right” to stop testology from applying such metaphors (or
to enforce the observance of all the metrological deﬁni-
tions and agreements to the last detail). The only criterion
of the validity of metaphors is their eﬀectiveness. Obvi-
ously, the canonical metaphor to try out is: “Testing is
measurement”.
Having established the applicability, either direct or
metaphorical, of metrological concepts to testing, we now
brieﬂy return to the “active-passive” dimension. Measure-
ment is popularly believed to be essentially passive, as it
is intended to assess the object of measurement “as it is”.
Contrary to this impression, the techniques of measure-
ment, which clearly constitute some part of its essence, are
explicitly divided into passive (as in measuring the radia-
tion spectrum of a body) and active. Measuring resistance
may be performed actively, by applying a certain voltage
(a stimulus) and observing the resulting current. The same
quantity may also be measured passively, by observing the
11Such pragmatic “ordering” should not be a priori rejected, in view of
the general shift from regarding measurement as determination (of some
elusive “true value”) towards treating it as assignment [51].
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relation between the current and the voltage in a circuit,
while refraining from actually applying either. Both would
be readily called “measurement”, with no methodological
and linguistic reservations. It is acknowledged that un-
der certain circumstances one technique is preferred over
the other, or is exclusively applicable, but no paradigmatic
preference is given to either. This symmetry is a feature
of metrology that should, by analogy, at least be given due
consideration in testology. Should metrology be consulted
for insights, testology would not ﬁnd there any justiﬁcation
for its current asymmetric views on the active nature of
testing.
8. Concluding Remarks
Any scientiﬁc community, including the testing community,
is free do deﬁne the scope of its interest, conceptual hori-
zon, and terminological (linguistic) devices. Such choices
are, however, not beyond the scope of external scrutiny.
They are also often the object of internal, intra-disciplinary
debate. For example, Gaudel [32] felt that it was necessary
to examine the general dictionary entries to recharge the
failing intuition of testing. Similarly, within the broad con-
text of information systems there are schools of thought
that, dissatisﬁed with a certain methodological lock-in, try
to re-deﬁne their discipline in terms of semiotics. Also in-
vestigations into how people use words have a long tradition
in social sciences and philosophy of science.
The presented high-level methodological discussion of test-
ing is not the ﬁrst of its kind. It is similar in vein, and
complementary (but more focused in scope) to [57]. It also
builds on [1] and [3], where an attempt is made at iden-
tifying and dismissing spurious incompatibilities between
the “testing-like” concepts developed by diﬀerent research
communities, and on [5], which surveys the methodological
aspects of looking for insight and borrowing concepts.
The aim of this work has been not to arbitrarily ﬁx a termi-
nological “misunderstanding”, but to show how testology
could be freed from a particular family of preconceptions
that seem to impede one direction of its development.
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